During most of 2005-10, the price of expiring U.S. corn, soybeans, and wheat futures contracts settled much higher than corresponding delivery market cash prices. Because futures contracts at expiration are commonly thought to be equivalent to cash grain, this commodity price non-convergence appeared inconsistent with the law of one price. In addition, sustained non-convergence concerns market participants, exchanges, and policymakers because it can make hedging less effective, send confusing signals to the market, threaten the viability of a contract, and ultimately lead to a misallocation of agricultural resources. This report summarizes prominent theories that have been offered to explain non-convergence, including a new model that explains how the structure of a competitive delivery market can generate a positive expiring basis. The data support this delivery market theory over alternative explanations. Finally, we discuss various policy levers that have been offered to address non-convergence, as well as their likely impacts.
Market observers offered several explanations for the non-convergence puzzle, but none was tested rigorously and shown to explain the problem. One theory is that "excessive speculation" by nontraditional fi nancial fi rms, like Commodity Index Traders (CITs), overpowered the ability of arbitrageurs to balance derivative and cash prices, leading to non-convergence in wheat markets. While it is true that CIT trading increased substantially during the time when non-convergence became a problem, this theory suffers from several theoretical limitations. For example, if purchasing behavior by these fi rms drove up the derivative price relative to the cash price, their equally sizable selling behavior before contract expiration should serve to force those prices together, leading to convergence. To maintain portfolio exposure, CITs enter one contract and then roll to the next, buying at fi rst and holding it until it almost expires, then selling it to buy the next expiration.
In another account, production and trade patterns for these commodities shifted away from longestablished delivery markets, limiting the ability of fi rms to arbitrage away the price difference between the two markets by engaging in the delivery process. On the other hand, the commercial fl ow for wheat in particular has bypassed these delivery markets for decades, so this theory does not adequately explain convergence problems observed since 2005.
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Introduction
A futures contract represents the obligation to trade a standardized quantity and quality of a given commodity at a specifi ed future period for an agreed-upon price. Commodities such as grains and oilseeds are traded in many locations across the United States, so futures exchanges have designated certain markets as delivery markets, identifying those areas where the liquidation of futures contracts by delivery is allowed. A cash price is the price for immediate exchange between buyer and seller, so the price of a futures contract, or the futures price, is generally conceived of as representing the expected cash price of the commodity in the delivery market, during the specifi ed delivery period. 1 Convergence implies that these prices draw together when the futures contract expires.
Under non-convergence, however, the price of the expiring futures contract does not equilibrate with the cash market price in the delivery period. For example, on July 1, 2008, the price for a July 2008 Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat futures contract closed at $8.50 per bushel. Even though that contract was eligible for immediate physical delivery, the going cash price in the Toledo, Ohio, delivery market was only $7.18 per bushel. An expiring basis of $1.32 is much larger than the normally observed range of 6 to 8 cents per bushel often attributed to delivery market frictions associated with the cost of load-out (Irwin et al., 2008; Kunda, 2010) . During 2005 to 2010, U.S. corn, soybeans, and wheat markets failed to converge at these unprecedented levels for a sustained period, as shown in fi gure 1. From 1986 to 2005, the average expiring basis at the cash markets in the chart was 1.8 cents, 1.8 cents, 10.8 cents, and -1.5 cents, for CBOT corn, soybeans, and wheat, and Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT) wheat, respectively. From 2005 to 2010, the average expiring basis at these same locations and markets was 18.2 cents, 20.3 cents, 49.2 cents, and 32.8 cents.
Because an expiring futures contract should be equivalent to cash market grain, non-convergence appears to be inconsistent with the law of one price and, therefore, to present an arbitrage opportunity. During 2005-10, the expiring futures price often exceeded the cash price for these commodities, so riskless profi ts apparently could be achieved by acquiring grain at low cash market prices 1 Notably, Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) argued that hedgers compensated speculators for providing them with risk management services; in a market with short hedgers, for example, the futures price would understate the expected future cash price. As the market converged (and the futures price increased relative to the expected cash price), the speculator would earn a premium for shielding the hedger from price risk. However, the empirical evidence for this risk premium in agricultural futures markets is weak (Chang, 1985; Fishe and Smith, 2011; Frank and Garcia, 2009; Hartzmark, 1987; and Hartzmark, 1991 and delivering it at high prices through short futures market positions in the expiring contract. Done simultaneously, this trading strategy would place downward pressure on the futures price, and upward pressure on the cash price, until the two converged (Hieronymus, 1977) . However, starting in late 2005, as more and more expirations failed to achieve convergence between futures and cash prices, some observers began to worry that recent changes in the structure of the market weakened the capacity for arbitrage and that the contract was "broken" and unable to fulfi ll its traditional role. 
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Note: The figure represents the end-of-day outstanding contracts for the nearby series in each market, rolled over 30 calendar days prior to contract expiration. 
The Role of Futures Markets Under Non-Convergence
Futures markets provide several important economic functions for agricultural commodities: price discovery, the opportunity for risk management, and the transmission of storage signals via the term spread. Unpredictable convergence undermines confi dence in the market's ability to perform each of these functions and can lead to signifi cant economic damage. When the market fails to converge, a commodity's expiring futures price lies somewhere above or below its corresponding price in the cash market. As a result, non-convergence implies that prices discovered in a futures market are an inaccurate representation of expected cash market prices in the expiration month.
If convergence failure is further characterized by futures and cash price series that bear an unpredictable relationship, the risk management benefi ts of hedging may be compromised. As an example, consider a short futures hedge, which involves a long cash position-say for a producer who expects to reap a harvest-and a short position in the futures market. This sort of strategy is designed to reduce risk exposure by compensating cash market losses (when cash prices fall) with short futures position gains (when futures prices fall). Now consider a "normal" market (i.e., a market in which the futures price exceeds the cash price by an amount equal to the price of storing the commodity from now until the futures contract expires). In this case, the market has set the futures price to equal the expected cash price at expiration and it is expecting the cash price to increase at a rate equal to the price of storage so that convergence occurs at expiration. In the interim, news may enter the market-say about the size of the harvest-and shift prices. In a converging market, such news affects the cash and futures prices equally (holding constant the price of storage). For each dollar lost by a lower expected cash price, the hedger gains an offsetting dollar on his futures position.
In a non-converging market, the hedger is still protected from price risk as long as the futures and cash prices trend one-for-one in the same direction. Cash market gains and losses are exactly offset by futures market gains and losses. Under this scenario, cash and futures prices do not converge to each other, but they converge to a predictable basis. On the other hand, if the basis at expiration exhibits random fl uctuations, then a hedger is not insulated from price risk. Because the utility of hedging depends on predictable basis relationships, novel or unpredictable basis phenomena can make hedging much less attractive.
Persistent non-convergence that suffi ciently degrades hedging effectiveness threatens the viability of a futures market, since its hedgers lose interest in trading Peck and Williams, 1991; Working, 1953; Working, 1970) . Moreover, unhedged merchandisers and producers face substantial price risks and welfare losses that jeopardize the conventional operation of the food production, marketing, and consumption chain. Of course, non-convergence need not threaten hedging effectiveness as long as its degree is predictable and participants are well-informed. When non-convergence is erratic, the timing of the placing and lifting of hedges will impact hedges' profi tability, making hedging risky. It is useful to note that the unprecedented level of recent corn, soybean, and wheat market non-convergence has not affected the level of futures trading noticeably. 
The Delivery Process
For many agricultural commodities, such as corn, soybeans, and wheat, terms of futures contracts are satisfi ed through a process that is closely related to physical delivery but does not require the movement of any grain. 3 As the contract nears expiration, the short side of a futures contract initiates the delivery sequence by choosing to make delivery rather than offset its position and notifi es the exchange accordingly. See fi gure 3 for an explanation of the contract termination choices available to a short trader. The exchange then informs the oldest outstanding long position holder of the responsibility to take delivery from the short. The futures contract is terminated when the short provides the long with delivery instruments in return for payment. Delivery instruments for KCBT wheat are warehouse receipts, which give the holder title to actual grain in storage at a storage facility. Shipping certifi cates are used in CBOT markets; these represent for the holder the right, but not the obligation, to demand load-out of the commodity from a particular shipping station. Shipping certifi cates also give the short more fl exibility in the delivery process because they do not represent physical grain in a regular warehouse, which takes up storage space that they might otherwise use. Instead, shipping certifi cates represent a commitment to provide grain when the certifi cate is canceled.
Delivery instruments provide the holder with access to grain, are transferrable, and do not require load-out within a specifi ed timeframe, so long as the holder pays a storage fee. Importantly, the maximum fee for holding a delivery instrument is set by the exchange. This fee, which is assessed daily, is paid to the regular-for-delivery warehouse, or "regular fi rm," that originated the delivery instrument. In return, the regular fi rm is responsible for presenting the grain to the holder, once loadout is requested. Regular fi rms regulate the delivery process: only they are able to create original delivery instruments. Before initiating delivery, other short position holders must acquire either new instruments from regular fi rms or existing instruments from other parties.
Typically, few deliveries are executed because trading the commodity through the delivery process is more expensive than offsetting the futures position and transacting directly with a trading partner. Grain and soybean futures markets are better suited to facilitate risk management and price discovery than to serve as a vehicle for exchange of physical title. In fact, extensive deliveries are a sign that a contract is out of balance, meaning that the delivery terms favor one side of the market or the other; contract design problems that encourage substantial deliveries cause futures markets to fail (Hieronymus, 1977) . In the extreme case, favored traders may attempt to use market power during the delivery period to artifi cially alter the price of the futures contract and make sizable profi ts (Pirrong, 1993; Pirrong, 2001) . When the contract is in balance and the market works properly, short and long position holders usually prefer to offset their futures positions. In doing so, both sides avoid the costs associated with the delivery process (e.g., placing grain in and out of storage, weights and grading fees, storage fees, interest costs, and the opportunity cost of backing the delivery instruments).
The price difference between futures contracts with different delivery dates is commonly referred to as the term spread or "carry." In a well-functioning market, this difference represents the return to physically storing the commodity between those dates. To market observers, that return is also known as the price of storage. Working (1949) and Brennan (1958) showed that the price of storage is determined by the storage market equilibrium, which occurs at the intersection of the demand and supply of storage. Assuming a fi xed supply of storage, a large harvest produces large inventories and high demand for storage services, which in turn increases the price of storage. In contrast, the storage fee for delivery instruments is written into futures contracts and set by the exchange; it does not necessarily represent the price of storage. Contract termination for a short trader NOTE: In the figure, nodes represent decision points, F is a futures price, P is a cash price, C is the expected number of months until cancelation of the delivery instrument, S is the monthly cost of physical storage, D is the price of the delivery instrument, and R is the contract storage rate on that instrument. For simplicity, the time value of money is not considered (i.e., the real interest rate is zero). 
Make delivery
Why Did Contracts Fail To Converge?
This section begins by summarizing the work of Garcia, Irwin, and Smith (2011) (referred to as GIS, from here), who attribute non-convergence to the institutional structure of the delivery market. 5 Next, alternative explanations for non-convergence are described. Finally, we share important results of GIS' empirical tests, which support the delivery market explanation for non-convergence.
Delivery Market Design
GIS shows how non-convergence can arise through the interaction of rational, competitive market participants. If the "wedge," or the price of physical storage minus the cost of holding a delivery instrument, is positive, the cost of holding delivery instruments is cheaper than storing grain physically. However, both represent the same amount of future grain. A fi rm that is short and makes delivery on a futures contract will not earn a large enough storage fee from the delivery instrument as compensation for the cost of storing the grain that backs the instrument. Such a fi rm therefore seeks compensation by issuing the delivery instruments at a high price relative to the price of cash grain. Recall that the price of a futures contract represents the market value of the delivery instrument at contract expiration, which can differ from the cash market grain price. As a result, fi rms are only willing to make futures market deliveries if the expiring futures price exceeds the price of cash grain by an amount suffi cient to compensate them for the artifi cially low storage fees they will receive on their outstanding instruments, for as long as the grain is expected to remain in storage. 6 To see formally why non-convergence works this way, imagine a market with two types of traders. Regular fi rms can store grain and can satisfy the short side of expiring futures contracts by making delivery, originating transferable delivery instruments that entitle the holder to a claim on grain that can be exchanged at any time, in return for the immediate-delivery futures price. Financial fi rms cannot store grain or issue delivery instruments, but they may settle the long side of an expiring futures contract by taking delivery, accomplished by paying the futures price for immediate delivery and accepting the delivery instrument. Financial fi rms can hold the delivery instrument indefi nitely, so long as they pay an exchange-set storage fee to the regular fi rm. Regular fi rms and fi nancial fi rms face borrowing costs, although the latter's may be lower due to possible advantages in capital markets. To describe the causes of non-convergence in the simplest possible terms, GIS specifi es that one rational representative fi rm of each type interacts over two trading periods, and both fi rms operate competitively and have identical information. The two fi rms trade in cash, futures, and delivery markets in the fi rst time period, and futures and cash prices converge in the second period. 7
Regular fi rms choose among three commodity storage options: (1) holding unhedged physical grain until sale at the period 2 cash price; (2) hedging grain by entering the short side of a futures contract for delivery in the following period; or (3) making delivery on a futures contract in period 1 by issuing a delivery instrument to the fi nancial fi rm and repurchasing the delivery instrument in period 2. Given the expectation of convergence in period 2, the absence of arbitrage using options 1 and 2 Non-Convergence in Domestic Commodity Futures Markets: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, EIB-115
Economic Research Service/USDA equates the futures price for later delivery to the period 1 cash price plus the total cost of physically storing the commodity. In effect, option 3 is equivalent to storing grain in the delivery market: when the fi nancial fi rm delivers the instrument back in period 2, the regular fi rm converts it into grain for sale in the cash market.
If the storage fee is set low enough, the return to option 3 becomes attractive to the fi nancial fi rm, which will demand as many delivery instruments as the regular fi rm is willing to offer. 8 By taking delivery, the fi nancial fi rm pays the futures price for immediate delivery and the storage fee in period 1, but earns the futures price for later delivery, discounted by its capital cost, once it redelivers the instrument back to the regular fi rm in the following period. 9 This strategy remains attractive to the fi nancial fi rm as long as the deferred futures price exceeds the price for immediate delivery by enough to cover the storage fee and capital costs. Because it behaves competitively, the fi nancial fi rm would bid down the term spread until it reaches full carry, which removes the opportunity for making excess profi ts. From the perspective of the fi nancial fi rm, a term spread at full carry represents equilibrium.
The supply of delivery instruments is determined by the regular fi rm. If the expiring futures price plus the storage fee is larger than the cost of issuing delivery instruments plus the discounted futures price for later delivery, the regular fi rm will choose to make delivery on futures contracts, issuing delivery instruments and storing grain in the delivery market. From the regular fi rm's perspective, this option partially subsidizes the storage costs for its grain, which never even needs to leave the warehouse. Furthermore, by issuing these delivery instruments, the regular fi rm effectively gains access to credit at the rate available to the fi nancial fi rm.
Non-convergence occurs when the storage fee is set too low. For example, say a large harvest leads to relatively plentiful inventories and therefore creates a high demand for storage space. This high demand forces the physical price of storage to exceed the cost of holding delivery instruments thereby creating a positive wedge. At the competitive market equilibrium, the wedge generates convergence failure because it creates a demand for delivery instruments that would increase the unconstrained futures term spread beyond the level of full carry. But because the term spread is capped at full carry, it understates the true price of physical grain storage. As both cash grain and the delivery instrument represent the same amount of period 2 grain, their present price must differ by the difference of the storage costs over the interim (i.e., the expiring futures price must rise above the current cash price to compensate the regular fi rm for receiving too low a storage fee on the delivery instruments it issues).
In effect, the wedge creates a non-convergence by decoupling the expiring futures contract from the cash grain market, since the delivery instruments will not be converted to grain until the second period. The low storage fee leads expiring futures contracts to instead refl ect the price of issuing delivery instruments-the price of period 2 grain rather than period 1 grain. GIS shows also that the 8 In the model, the demand for delivery instruments is perfectly elastic. In a market with warehouse receipts, such as the KCBT, the number of delivery instruments is capped at the amount that accounts for all the space in regular-for-delivery warehouses. For corn and soybeans, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (CME) limits the amount of shipping certifi cates that each regular fi rm may issue based on its throughput and net worth; the exchange adds a storage capacity requirement for wheat contracts. In 2009, the CME placed limits on the number of shipping certifi cates a fi nancial fi rm may hold. See www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/fi les/CBOT_RA0903-1.pdf. 9 Aulerich, Fishe, and Harris describe the embedded real option that non-convergence assigns to delivery instruments (2011).
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Economic Research Service/USDA magnitude of convergence failure increases as the fi nancial fi rm's borrowing costs become cheaper relative to the regular fi rm, since that reduces the value of full carry and expands the wedge. Figure 4 is a graphical depiction of a simplifi ed version of the model. In each panel, the fi rst fi gure represents the storage market. The second shows the cash market (C) prices over three or four time periods along with futures (F i ) delivered in each intervening time period (t i ). Each time period, the cash price increases by an amount equal to the price of physical storage. This increase compensates the owners of the commodity for the cost of storage. We construct the fi gures so that all prices converge in the fi nal period for every panel in the chart.
Panel A depicts a market in which the price of storage is positive but not as large as the delivery instrument storage rate (P bar ). The term spread is large enough to compensate for the price of storage (P I ), and the market converges at all periods. Convergence is represented by the gray and orange dashed lines (futures prices on two contracts) converging to the green dashed line (cash price). In panel B, a large harvest at t 0 leads to an excess commodity supply that drives the demand for storage services higher (to D II ) and increases the market price of storage (to P II ) and thus causes cash prices to increase at a higher rate. Because the delivery instrument storage rate (P bar ) is suffi ciently high, the term spread (the difference between F 2 and F 1 ) is able to expand suffi ciently to express the market price of storage, and futures and cash prices still converge.
In Panel C, the maximum storage rate on the delivery instrument is set too low, so the wedge is positive. This wedge is not expected to persist after t 2 , so the futures price converges to cash in t 2 (the dashed orange line converges to the green spot price line). Between t 1 and t 2 , the term spread is capped at P bar to prevent arbitrage on delivery instruments. The term spread cannot expand to the price of grain storage (P II ), so it understates the true price of storage. Therefore, the price of delivery instruments at t 1 , F 1 , must rise above the current cash price, C, to compensate the regular fi rm for the low storage rate it earns by issuing delivery instruments. Now, F 1 is "decoupled" from the cash price-the futures contract for delivery in t 1 no longer represents the expected cash price at t 1 , but instead, the expected price of the delivery instrument at expiry: the cash price plus w.
In panel C, the wedge expires after period 1; panel D shows how the magnitude of non-convergence increases as the expected life of the wedge rises (now, through period 2). Once again, the no-arbitrage condition caps the term spread between all futures prices at P bar , so it cannot expand to refl ect P II . Now, F 2 does not converge with the cash price, but instead realizes the cash price at t 2 plus w. And when F 1 delivers at t 1 , the expiring basis is even larger than it is in Panel C-now 2w-refl ecting the fact that the wedge is expected to last over two periods from t 0 to t 2 .
On the other hand, if the wedge is not positive, the grain market converges. For example, if an unexpectedly small harvest drives the price of physical storage below the level required for the fi nancial fi rm to demand delivery instruments, any delivery instruments issued would immediately be converted to grain (i.e., load-out would occur). Without a positive wedge, the term spread refl ects the price of physical storage, and the expiring futures price is able to adjust to the current cash price. The basis for the expiring futures contract is zero, so the market converges. A negative wedge generates a term spread that is lower than full carry, and the market likewise converges (see panels A and B in fi gure 4).
In addition to inventory levels, the model predicts that other variables can affect convergence. An increase in the maximum delivery instrument storage rate lowers the demand for delivery instruments, reducing the disparity between futures and cash prices, as does a higher borrowing cost for fi nancial fi rms. Likewise, the expiring basis is reduced if the regular fi rm faces smaller physical Non-convergence is caused by the wedge, continued
Note: P I and P II represent the price of storage under demand levels D I and D II ; storage supply is given by S. P bar is the maximum storage rate on the delivery instrument. C is the cash market price; F i is the futures contract price for delivery at t i for i=1,2,3. The wedge is represented by w. A positive wedge signifies non-convergence. For simplicity, the chart assumes no time value of money.
Panel C: Non-convergence at t 1 when the demand for inventories increases and the delivery instrument storage rate is too low
Inventory
Panel D: The magnitude of non-convergence at t 1 increases when the wedge is expected to last for a longer period of time 2. The exchange-set futures contract storage fee is too low, leading to a "wedge" between the price of storage and the cost of holding delivery instruments (w in fi gure 4).
3. The wedge makes the physical storage of grain unattractive to the regular fi rm, who instead seeks to issue a delivery instrument for a high price-effectively store grain in the delivery market-earning the return from issuing delivery instruments (the expiring futures price plus the storage fee).
4.
With a low storage fee, taking delivery becomes appealing for the fi nancial fi rm, which demands as many delivery instruments as the regular fi rm will issue as long as the term spread is suffi cient to compensate it for the storage fee plus its borrowing costs (full carry).
5. The equilibrium futures term spread is capped at full carry (P bar in fi gure 4), which is lower than the true price of physical storage (P II in fi gure 4).
6. Because the cash grain and the delivery instrument represent the same amount of future grain, their present price must differ by the present value of their storage costs over the interim, so the futures price fails to converge to the cash price. In fi gure 4, panel C, F 1 >C at t 1 . In panel D, the expiring futures price exceeds the cash price at both t 1 and t 2 . 
A Small Wedge Can Generate a Large Degree of Non-Convergence
Convergence:
Wedge < 0 ⇒ Basis = 0 and Spread < Full Carry storage costs or capital costs, since those costs shift the supply of storage curve to the right. Providing the regular fi rm with monopoly power in grain storage raises the expected price of storage and expands the wedge, although the latter is still determined by the difference between the price of physically storing grain and the cost of holding delivery instruments.
Extending this framework to a multiple-period model, GIS shows that the expiring basis in any period becomes the present value of the expected stream of future wedges for as long as they are predicted to remain positive (see panel D in fi gure 4). The basis must be large enough to compensate the regular fi rm for the too-low storage rate for as long as the fi nancial fi rm is projected to hold the instrument. Consequently, even a relatively small wedge can generate a large degree of non-convergence if it is expected to persist long enough, accounting for the remarkably wide basis observed during recent non-convergence episodes. For example, a wedge of just 5 cents per month that is expected to persist for 2 years implies a basis of about $1.20 (see box, "A Small Wedge Can Generate a Large Degree of Non-Convergence," p. 13).
Alternative Explanations for Non-Convergence
One theory is that large long positions held by passive commodity index traders (CITs) led to a breakdown between the Chicago futures market and the cash market for wheat (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2009). This theory is part of a larger movement that argues fi rms who trade futures in large volume but do not have a directional interest in the underlying commodity price bias derivatives prices away from their fundamental level (Masters, 2011; Soros, 2008; UNCTAD, 2011) . CITs sell fi nancial instruments like index swaps and facilitate the sale of exchange-traded notes and exchange-traded funds to customers who seek investment exposure to commodity prices. To offset their risk, CITs purchase long positions in commodity futures contracts. Because they tend to hold these positions for a relatively long period of time and roll them over from one contract expiration to the next, CITs are said to trade "passively" and are referred to by observers as "passive longs." Several of these fi rms have applied for and received "hedge exemptions" from normal speculative position limits, as they trade commodity futures contracts to manage the risks associated with fi nancial investment portfolios. Since the early 2000s, CITs have rapidly increased their presence in commodity futures markets; from 2003 to 2008, the value of these traders' holdings increased by a factor of 10. Likewise, Irwin and Sanders (2011) show that the share of corn, soybeans, and wheat open interest held by CITs increased signifi cantly over the same time period. Notably, the rise of CIT trading coincides with the convergence problems observed in the futures markets for these commodities.
According to this theory, CIT trading activity constituted a major new source of demand for long commodity futures contracts, unrelated to underlying market fundamentals. By entering a large amount of long futures contracts, CITs boosted the "demand" for these contracts without increasing the demand for the underlying physical commodity. As a result, CITs infl ated a speculative bubble, driving the price of these contracts higher than the cash market price and increasing the futures term spreads above the level justifi ed by a rational market. The resulting price differentials distorted traditional storage signals, leading commodity holders to store grain for profi t rather than imposing convergence by arbitraging the difference between futures and cash prices.
However, the speculative bubble theory suffers from numerous limitations. First, the idea that CIT traders' order fl ows can even consistently impact futures prices relies on important assumptions that are not necessarily consistent with the way that these fi rms are known to operate (Irwin and Sanders, 2011 between CIT trading and futures prices or term spreads (Buyuksahin and Harris, 2011; Irwin and Sanders, 2011; Stoll and Whaley, 2010) , and those few that suggest such a relationship suffer from important weaknesses (Fattouh, Kilian, and Mahaveda, 2012; Irwin and Sanders, 2001 ). The bubble theory also fails a logical test with respect to convergence: if CIT behavior widens term spreads to the degree that grain elevators choose to "hoard" the commodity and take it off the market, then its cash price should increase as current available supply falls. At the same time, the tendency of CITs to roll their positions should (according to this theory) put downward pressure on expiring futures prices. These two forces should act to force the cash and expiring futures prices together, shrinking the delivery month basis and generating convergence.
Another explanation for non-convergence is that changes in commodity production patterns and transportation logistics rendered traditional delivery points out of the commercial fl ow of the commodity . According to this hypothesis, regular warehouses were "out of position" in relation to commodity production and trade. As a result, they found it too expensive to draw a suffi cient amount of the commodity to arbitrage the basis and effect convergence by initiating enough deliveries. In practice, this theory is most applicable to the CBOT soft red wheat (SRW) contract. When the CBOT was established in the mid-19th century, Chicago was the most important cash grain market in the United States. Over time, as the production and marketing channels for the commodities shifted away from the Great Lakes region, the original delivery markets became less commercially important. In 2000, CBOT revised the delivery points for corn and soybeans to better represent the commercial fl ow of the commodity. CBOT maintained the traditional delivery points for wheat, however, until 2009 when persistently small commercial activity at these locations prompted a concern that deliverable supplies were "out of position." At that time, CBOT added Northwest Ohio, Ohio, and Mississippi River barge shipping stations to the established delivery locations for soft red wheat: Chicago (Illinois), Toledo (Ohio), and St. Louis (Missouri). Irwin et al. point out that because these structural problems existed before the recent episode, it is unclear how this theory explains recent non-convergence problems (2011).
Empirical Evidence
The best available test of the competing non-convergence theories is performed in GIS, which estimates an econometric model of the KCBT wheat, and CBOT corn, soybean, and wheat markets. Using relevant futures and cash market prices, the expiring basis series for these markets is calculated over the last two decades. 10 The authors approximate the wedge using the change in the basis, and test which variables explain the series. Given a constant storage fee, the delivery market design theory predicts that the wedge increases with aggregate inventories at deliverable locations; an unexpectedly good harvest that produces a temporarily negative price shock can induce non-convergence as deliverable inventories ramp up. Besides inventories, important variables to include in the econometric model to explain the wedge include credit spreads and the delivery instrument storage rate.
To account for the possibility that fi nancial fi rms generated a speculative bubble that overpowered the ability of arbitrageurs to impose convergence, the "net long" open interest held by commodity index traders, or the number of long minus short contracts, is included as an explanatory variable. Confi rming the delivery market design theory's predictions, inventories are the most important factor in explaining the change in the expiring basis and prove to be highly economically signifi cant. 11 The authors estimate that the CBOT wheat market wedge expanded by over 2.6 cents per month, given the doubling in deliverable stocks from 2004 to 2008. That expansion represents 60 percent of the value of the CBOT contract storage fee, which was 4.5 cents per month at the time. As expected, the wedge is highly seasonal for all commodities: it is largest near the harvest and falls as the marketing year progresses and inventories draw down. Coeffi cients on other variables are not signifi cant, although they generally exhibit the expected signs. Conspicuously, the data do not support the index trader/speculative bubble theory. Commodity index trader positions are not found to affect the change in the basis over time: the coeffi cient on their open interest is not at all signifi cant in explaining the change in the basis over time, and the sign is not consistent across commodities.
In addition to the econometric results, GIS provides compelling graphical evidence to support the contention that non-convergence is an unintentional product of delivery market structure. In fi gure 5, the authors show an example of how non-convergence is closely tied to the wedge, which drives the accumulation of inventories in the delivery market. 12 For those market episodes in panel A where inventories surge suffi ciently, the price of physical storage rises above the storage fee in panel B, and non-convergence occurs in panel C. Figure 6 shows that the expiring basis value implied by the model (estimated using two different techniques) matches the observed magnitude of non-convergence very closely for all commodities except CBOT soybeans, although the model captures the incidence of the latter quite well. This result validates the model prediction that even a small wedge can generate a high degree of non-convergence.
Implications of Empirical Evidence
Recent episodes of non-convergence are explained well by competitive, rational participants acting within the structure of existing delivery markets. Furthermore, the data show that the expiring basis is a good approximation of the present value of the sum of future positive wedges. Appealing to alternative explanations, like irrational speculative bubbles or limits to arbitrage, is not necessary to explain the incidence or magnitude of non-convergence. What's more, the alternative theories lack empirical support.
Traditionally, the futures term spread has been interpreted as the return to storing the commodity (Working, 1949) . However, the delivery market design theory shows that a wedge caps the futures term spread below the true price of storage. As a result, when the market fails to converge, the futures term spread represents only the downward biased return to storage. In GIS's model, both participant fi rms are equally informed, so there are no negative welfare effects associated with nonconvergence. But if some participants in the market are not as well informed and they use the term spread to guide physical storage decisions, they may store less than is optimal under non-convergence, leading to an ineffi cient allocation of agricultural resources. Similarly, if farmers interpret the magnitude of non-convergence as an indication of the direction of future cash grain prices-rather than as an artifact of the difference in asset storage costs-then they may plant more acres to the crop than is optimal. 
Policy Options To Improve Convergence
Exchanges and policymakers have a strong interest in preserving confi dence in futures markets, which is undermined when convergence becomes unpredictable. Several general solutions have been proposed to address the non-convergence problem in order to maintain the market's ability to perform its economic functions (Irwin et al., 2008) . We describe and evaluate these below, based on the model and empirical evidence discussed in this report; fi gure 7 summarizes the options along with their potential benefi ts and costs.
Change the Delivery Instrument Storage Rate
Under the delivery market design theory, non-convergence is caused by a positive wedge between the price of storage and the cost of holding delivery instruments. Therefore, the exchange can drive the wedge to zero and impose convergence by increasing the storage fee to a level that makes holding delivery instruments unattractive. This can be done by setting a fi xed rate so high that it will not permit a wedge even when the demand for storage-and thus the price of storage-is very high, or by creating a variable storage rate that changes based on market conditions.
To address the problem of non-convergence, in 2009 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (CME) replaced its previously fi xed CBOT wheat shipping certifi cate storage rate with a new Variable Storage Rate (VSR) system (Seamon, 2009 ). The CBOT wheat VSR makes storing delivery instruments more expensive when the market nears full carry, but decreases storage rates as the term spread narrows. Under the VSR, the per bushel cost of holding delivery instruments for a month increases by about 3 cents if the expired nearby term spread averaged more than 80 percent of the full carry value, does not change if the expired spread average between 50 and 80 percent of full carry, and decreases by around 3 cents if that spread averaged below 50 percent of full carry, until it reaches a fl oor of 1 cent per bushel, per month. Since its introduction, the VSR has increased the storage rate for CBOT wheat and restored convergence to that market.
Because the VSR aligns the storage fee with the price of storage, it effectively eliminates the wedge in a non-converging market over time. Although it operates incrementally and shifts the storage fee based on lagged observations, a variable storage rate limits the degree to which the price of storage can depart from the cost of holding delivery instruments in a converging market. In this way, even if non-convergence between cash and futures prices is still theoretically possible, the VSR ensures that it will be small in size and short-lived, since rational traders know that the cost of holding delivery instruments will quickly adjust to correct a wedge. Another advantage of the VSR, besides the fact that it is shown to work in practice, is that it maintains the traditional delivery process, helping prevent price manipulation like corners (Pirrong, 1993; Pirrong, 2001) .
One disadvantage of the VSR is that its complicated method of calculation makes it prone to misinterpretation. Although they acknowledge the VSR has achieved price convergence, some traders still fi nd the CBOT wheat VSR to be controversial. These participants have expressed a concern that higher storage fees established by the VSR will cause regular fi rms to choose to hoard wheat by issuing shipping certifi cates and earning storage fees, rather than transacting grain as part of their normal operations (Stebbins, 2011) . To make this theory work, a long-side trader is required, one who is willing to purchase these shipping certifi cates and hold them for a long time, paying very high storage rates. In addition, holding SRW wheat off the market in this way would boost its cash prices relative to other grains whose futures markets do not employ the VSR. In fact, the opposite 
Force load-out
Change exchange rules to prohibit fi rms from holding delivery instruments beyond a specifi ed period.
Traders who hold futures contracts until expiry would be required to load-out. The delivery process would require the physical transfer of grain; instruments could no longer be held indefi nitely.
The price of futures contracts would more accurately refl ect the price of grain in the cash market.
Erodes existing delivery system protections against market manipulation. When some fi rms are required to take a particular action (in this case, to load out), other fi rms may be able to exploit this requirement by charging excessive loading and transportation fees.
Make the futures contract cash settled
Create a benchmark cash price index for the commodity. Change the terms of the futures contract so that its value at expiration equals the price of the index on that day.
Traders who hold futures contracts until expiry would exchange payments based on the value of the cash index.
The price of the expiring futures contract will always converge to the value of the cash index, by construction.
Removes existing delivery system protections against market manipulation. Devising the appropriate benchmark cash price index can be diffi cult.
Make the delivery process easier
Increase the amount of warehouse space available for physical deliveries, expand the allowable delivery territory, and/or reduce existing limits on issuing delivery instruments.
Encourage greater participation in the delivery process: more futures contracts would be settled using delivery instruments.
Fewer restrictions allow more traders to balance cash and futures prices through arbitrage (assuming the existing structure prevents these trades right now).
Scant evidence to support the claim that the existing number of deliveries is too low, or that more/easier deliveries will generate convergence. Does not address incentive to hold delivery instruments.
Crack down on speculators
Apply speculative position limits to commodity index traders (CITs has occurred with respect to corn (Gillam, 2011) . Another drawback to the VSR is that it incorporates some uncertainty into futures prices, and the spreads between them, since the delivery instrument storage rate can be updated in real time. Therefore, prices for deferred delivery contracts are less reliable, and the spreads between them are a less reliable indicator for storage signals than they would be under a fi xed storage rate.
Like the VSR, a high fi xed storage rate would maintain the traditional delivery process. A fi xedrate system is currently used in the CBOT corn, soybeans, and KCBT wheat markets. 13 Because it is fi xed, this type of storage rate is more transparent than the VSR, is more easily understood by traders, does not add extra uncertainty about futures spreads, and is even less likely to offer incentives for manipulation at contract expiry. To set an appropriate fi xed rate, the exchange could consider the market price of physical storage over the last decade and choose a level at or just above its peak. Until recently, exchanges maintained fi xed delivery instrument storage rates for long periods of time. 14 It is important to note that, whatever storage rate system is employed, the exchange only sets the maximum storage rate for delivery instruments-individual regular fi rms are free to charge a lower rate. In a competitive market, a high contract storage rate maximum wouldn't bind under normal conditions, so a regular fi rm would charge a delivery instrument storage rate in line with the physical price of storage. One drawback is that this maximum rate could act as a magnet for delivery instrument storage rates among regular fi rms: as a price ceiling, it may serve as a signal for regular fi rms to collude and charge higher storage rates (Knittel and Stango, 2003) . The possibility for this type of collusion has always existed, but we know of no instances of it occurring. Moreover, the potential for onfarm storage and for small elevators to undercut fi rms by charging artifi cially high storage rates makes such collusion unlikely to occur.
Force Load-Out
Strictly limiting the life of the delivery instrument, say to the end of the delivery month, ensures that the long side will load-out soon after taking delivery. By eliminating the ability to hold delivery instruments, forcing load-out compels expiring futures prices to refl ect those in the cash market, guaranteeing convergence. This solution would produce a similar result as a high fi xed storage rate on delivery instruments, with the additional complication that individual fi rms would not be allowed to charge a lower rate (everybody has to load-out). One advantage to arranging storage rates this way is that an unusually large demand for storage services cannot cause futures and cash prices to diverge, which could happen if the maximum fi xed rate is not suffi ciently high.
However, forcing load-out makes manipulation more attractive to short traders with monopoly power in the delivery market. Traders holding short positions wish to lower the price of the expiring futures contract and widen the term spread. If a trader is large enough, it can accomplish this objective by exercising market power to temporarily increase the deliverable supply of the commodity (Pirrong, 1993) traders have the fl exibility to wait and load-out under more favorable cash market conditions, counteracting the market power of large short traders. On the other hand, a forced load-out scheme would prevent longs from using the delivery process to accumulate delivery instruments. Still, forcing loadout represents more change to the existing contract than aligning storage rates, and it also fails to preserve the current delivery instrument system, making price manipulation more likely.
Change the Futures Contract Terms To Require Cash Settlement
As opposed to settlement by physical delivery, under cash settlement, an expiring futures contract is terminated by a payment exchange between long and short, based on the fi nal settlement price. Rules for obtaining this price are determined by the exchange and are written into the futures contract terms. For example, the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGEX) lists cash-settled futures contracts for soft red winter wheat, hard red winter wheat, corn, and soybeans. These contracts are all settled to an average of the national cash price bids for the commodity during the delivery month, as calculated by the Data Transmission Network (DTN), so convergence always occurs by defi nition. Although they were introduced in December 2004, practically no trading occurs on any of the cashsettled MGEX contracts. 15 Likewise, making CBOT corn, soybean, and wheat contracts cash settled would ensure convergence to an index of cash prices. However, because they are storable, abandoning the longstanding physical delivery process for these commodities leaves them more susceptible to manipulation by large long traders (Pirrong, 2001 ). Under physical delivery, an exchange can and typically does offer short traders a variety of delivery options in terms of grade and location, which reduces the attractiveness to the long traders of forcing excessive deliveries. On the other hand, large long traders can more easily increase the price of a cash-settled contract by purchasing the appropriate varieties of the commodity in the cash market based on the formula used to calculate the settlement index.
Arguably, cash settlement is well suited to trading termination for many futures contracts, most notably the Standard & Poor's 500 index but also for livestock contracts like lean hogs. An important feature of the indices that these contracts settle to, though, is that the prices of the underlying assets that comprise them are publicly reported. Prices for stocks in the S&P 500 index are available to the latest second, while livestock cash markets are subject to mandatory price reporting requirements. Conversely, grain and oilseed markets do not report their cash prices publicly. As a result, cash settlement for corn, soybeans, and wheat contracts would probably be tied to cash price bids (the method used by the related index contracts on the MGEX). Compared to actual cash prices, bids are far more easily manipulated, since they do not represent the execution of an actual transaction between buyer and seller. Finally, changing the contract terms to require cash settlement represents a more drastic change to the existing grain and oilseed contracts than aligning the storage rates for the physical commodity and the delivery instrument.
Make Delivery Easier
If limits to arbitrage inhibit convergence, enhancing the capacity of the delivery market should help arbitrageurs engage in the type of trading that will force expiring futures and cash prices together. This could be accomplished by increasing the amount of regular-for-delivery warehouse space at existing locations, expanding the allowable delivery territory, or increasing the maximum number of delivery instruments a regular fi rm may issue. In 2009, CME added three delivery points to its SRW wheat contract, which better represented primary production and marketing areas for the commodity (Seamon, 2010) . But GIS shows that although high delivery costs on their own may affect the number of delivery instruments the regular fi rm is willing to issue, they will not affect the basis, and therefore not improve convergence. Reducing the cost of issuing delivery instruments by, for example, expanding the regular-for-delivery warehouse space or adding deliverable territories encourages the regular fi rm to simply issue additional instruments until the marginal cost of delivery increases back to its previous level.
Tighten Speculative Position Limits
One way to address "excessive speculation" by CITs is to place limits on their trading ability. Speculative limits have been used in agricultural futures markets for decades: those traders who do not have a commercial interest in the underlying commodity ordinarily face caps on the number of positions they may hold. 16 Until recently, CITs were regularly awarded exemptions from these limits.
Besides the fact that evidence for the benefi ts of position limits is scarce, the speculative bubble/ index trader theory suffers from theoretical weaknesses (as described on pp. 14-15). Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that CIT positions do not correlate with basis changes in the corn, soybeans, and wheat markets. That is, the data do not support the contention that speculative activities by CITs caused convergence problems. For all these reasons, imposing position limits on index traders is unlikely to improve convergence. Indeed, doing so may actually generate other unintended, negative consequences with respect to risk transfer and price discovery (Pirrong, 2010 
Conclusion
From 2005 to 2010, sustained, unprecedented non-convergence levels in domestic corn, soybean, and wheat futures markets led many observers to wonder if the traditional price-discovery and risk-management functions of these markets had weakened. Popular explanations for the nonconvergence problem involved constraints to arbitrage (whether or not they were caused by an irrational speculative bubble) or delivery markets that no longer regulated the commercial fl ow of the commodity. However, convergence failures in grain and soybean markets are most likely an unintended result of the delivery market structure for these commodities. Specifi cally, the storage rate of the delivery instrument was set too low relative to the true price of storage: the wedge between the costs of holding delivery instruments and storing physical grain caused non-convergence.
GIS shows theoretically and empirically that recent episodes of non-convergence are well explained by competitive, rational participants acting within the structure of existing delivery markets.
Predictions from their competitive model match the incidence and magnitude of non-convergence very well. Alternative claims like irrational speculative bubbles lack both theoretical and empirical support as an explanation for recent convergence problems. Therefore, tightening the enforcement of speculative position limits would likely not improve convergence and could produce unintended consequences that negatively impact the ability of futures markets to discover prices and transfer risk effi ciently.
Because non-convergence confuses traditional storage signals, it may lead to welfare losses among less informed market participants, so futures exchanges and policymakers have an interest in preventing future episodes. Changing the futures contract terms to align the storage rates in the physical and delivery instrument markets, via either a variable storage rate or a high maximum fi xed rate, represents less change to the existing contract than forcing load-out or switching to cash settlement. Maintaining the storage rate system also preserves the traditional delivery process along with its built-in protection against manipulation. The fi xed rate has worked well until recently and has an additional advantage of being easier to understand than a variable storage rate.
